Provisional text
OPINION OF ADVOCATE GENERAL
MEDINA
delivered on 19 November 2026 (1)
Case C‑643/25
Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände – Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V.
v
Meta Platforms Ireland Limited
(Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany))
( Reference for a preliminary ruling – Consumer protection – Directive 2005/29/EC – Unfair commercial practices – Business-to-consumer commercial practices – Article 5(5) – Point 20 of Annex I – Commercial practices which are considered unfair in all circumstances – Describing a product as ‘gratis’, ‘free’ or ‘without charge’ – Supply of a social network – Registration conditional on the disclosure of personal data and consent to their use for commercial purposes – Concept of costs to be ‘paid’ )
1. This request for a preliminary ruling concerns the statement ‘Facebook ist und bleibt kostenlos’ (‘Facebook is and remains free’) (‘the statement in question’), which was shown on the German-language registration page of the online social network Facebook website in February 2015.
2. The Court must determine whether, when registering as a user of the social network and disclosing personal data for commercial use, a consumer effectively ‘has to pay’ something within the meaning of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC, (2) that is to say, something other than the unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of the item. If so, describing that service as free of charge would constitute an unfair commercial practice in all circumstances under that provision.
3. The request has been made in proceedings between the Bundesverband der Verbraucherzentralen und Verbraucherverbände – Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband e.V. (Federal Union of Consumer Organisations and Associations, Germany) (‘the Federal Union’) and Meta Platforms Ireland Limited (‘Meta’), which operates Facebook in the European Union.
I. Legal framework
A. European Union law
1. Directive 2005/29
4. Recitals 7, 11, 13, 14 and 17 of Directive 2005/29 state:
‘(7) This Directive addresses commercial practices directly related to influencing consumers’ transactional decisions in relation to products. …
…
(11) The high level of convergence achieved by the approximation of national provisions through this Directive creates a high common level of consumer protection. This Directive establishes a single general prohibition of those unfair commercial practices distorting consumers’ economic behaviour. It also sets rules on aggressive commercial practices, which are currently not regulated at Community level.
…
(13) In order to achieve the Community’s objectives through the removal of internal market barriers, it is necessary to replace Member States’ existing, divergent general clauses and legal principles. The single, common general prohibition established by this Directive therefore covers unfair commercial practices distorting consumers’ economic behaviour. In order to support consumer confidence the general prohibition should apply equally to unfair commercial practices which occur outside any contractual relationship between a trader and a consumer or following the conclusion of a contract and during its execution. The general prohibition is elaborated by rules on the two types of commercial practices which are by far the most common, namely misleading commercial practices and aggressive commercial practices.
(14) It is desirable that misleading commercial practices cover those practices, including misleading advertising, which by deceiving the consumer prevent him from making an informed and thus efficient choice. … The full harmonisation approach adopted in this Directive does not preclude the Member States from specifying in national law the main characteristics of particular products such as, for example, collectors’ items or electrical goods, the omission of which would be material when an invitation to purchase is made. …
…
(17) It is desirable that those commercial practices which are in all circumstances unfair be identified to provide greater legal certainty. Annex I therefore contains the full list of all such practices. These are the only commercial practices which can be deemed to be unfair without a case-by-case assessment against the provisions of Articles 5 to 9. The list may only be modified by revision of the Directive.’
5. Article 2 of Directive 2005/29, headed ‘Definitions’, provides:
‘For the purposes of this Directive:
…
(c) “product” means any goods or service including immovable property, rights and obligations;
(d) “business-to-consumer commercial practices” (hereinafter also referred to as commercial practices) means any act, omission, course of conduct or representation, commercial communication including advertising and marketing, by a trader, directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers;
…’.
6. Point (c) of Article 2 of Directive 2005/29 was subsequently replaced by Article 3(1)(a) of Directive (EU) 2019/2161, (3) and now reads:
‘“product” means any good or service including immovable property, digital service and digital content, as well as rights and obligations;’
7. Article 5 of Directive 2005/29, headed ‘Prohibition of unfair commercial practices’, provides as follows:
‘1. Unfair commercial practices shall be prohibited.
…
5. Annex I contains the list of those commercial practices which shall in all circumstances be regarded as unfair. The same single list shall apply in all Member States and may only be modified by revision of this Directive.’
8. Annex I to that directive, headed ‘Commercial practices which are in all circumstances considered unfair’, provides, in point 20:
‘Describing a product as “gratis”, “free”, “without charge” or similar if the consumer has to pay anything other than the unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of the item.’
2. Directive (EU) 2019/770
9. Recital 24 of Directive (EU) 2019/770 (4) states:
‘Digital content or digital services are often supplied also where the consumer does not pay a price but provides personal data to the trader. Such business models are used in different forms in a considerable part of the market. While fully recognising that the protection of personal data is a fundamental right and that therefore personal data cannot be considered as a commodity, this Directive should ensure that consumers are, in the context of such business models, entitled to contractual remedies. … The personal data could be provided to the trader either at the time when the contract is concluded or at a later time, such as when the consumer gives consent for the trader to use any personal data that the consumer might upload or create with the use of the digital content or digital service. … For example, this Directive should apply where the consumer opens a social media account and provides a name and email address that are used for purposes other than solely supplying the digital content or digital service, or other than complying with legal requirements. It should equally apply where the consumer gives consent for any material that constitutes personal data, such as photographs or posts that the consumer uploads, to be processed by the trader for marketing purposes. Member States should however remain free to determine whether the requirements for the formation, existence and validity of a contract under national law are fulfilled.’
10. Article 3 of Directive 2019/770, headed ‘Scope’, provides in paragraph 1:
‘This Directive shall apply to any contract where the trader supplies or undertakes to supply digital content or a digital service to the consumer and the consumer pays or undertakes to pay a price.
This Directive shall also apply where the trader supplies or undertakes to supply digital content or a digital service to the consumer, and the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data to the trader, except where the personal data provided by the consumer are exclusively processed by the trader for the purpose of supplying the digital content or digital service in accordance with this Directive or for allowing the trader to comply with legal requirements to which the trader is subject, and the trader does not process those data for any other purpose.’
3. Directive 2011/83/EU
11. Article 3(1) of Directive 2011/83/EU, (5) headed ‘Scope’, provided, in the version applicable at the time of the facts in the main proceedings:
‘This Directive shall apply, under the conditions and to the extent set out in its provisions, to any contract concluded between a trader and a consumer. It shall also apply to contracts for the supply of water, gas, electricity or district heating, including by public providers, to the extent that these commodities are provided on a contractual basis.’
12. Article 4(2) of Directive 2019/2161 amended that provision in two respects. First, paragraph 1 was replaced by the following:
‘1. This Directive shall apply, under the conditions and to the extent set out in its provisions, to any contract concluded between a trader and a consumer where the consumer pays or undertakes to pay the price. It shall apply to contracts for the supply of water, gas, electricity or district heating, including by public providers, to the extent that these commodities are provided on a contractual basis.’
13. Second, paragraph 1a was inserted:
‘This Directive shall also apply where the trader supplies or undertakes to supply digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium or a digital service to the consumer and the consumer provides or undertakes to provide personal data to the trader, except where the personal data provided by the consumer are exclusively processed by the trader for the purpose of supplying the digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium or digital service in accordance with this Directive or for allowing the trader to comply with legal requirements to which the trader is subject, and the trader does not process those data for any other purpose.’
14. Recital 31 of Directive 2019/2161 states:
‘Digital content and digital services are often supplied online under contracts under which the consumer does not pay a price but provides personal data to the trader. Directive 2011/83/EU already applies to contracts for the supply of digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium (i.e. supply of online digital content) regardless of whether the consumer pays a price in money or provides personal data. However, that Directive only applies to service contracts, including contracts for digital services, under which the consumer pays or undertakes to pay a price. Consequently, that Directive does not apply to contracts for digital services under which the consumer provides personal data to the trader without paying a price. Given their similarities and the interchangeability of paid digital services and digital services provided in exchange for personal data, they should be subject to the same rules under that Directive.’
4. The European Electronic Communications Code
15. Recital 16 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 (6) (‘the European Electronic Communications Code’) states:
‘In order to fall within the scope of the definition of electronic communications service, a service needs to be provided normally in exchange for remuneration. In the digital economy, market participants increasingly consider information about users as having a monetary value. Electronic communications services are often supplied to the end-user not only for money, but increasingly and in particular for the provision of personal data or other data. The concept of remuneration should therefore encompass situations where the provider of a service requests and the end-user knowingly provides personal data within the meaning of [the GDPR (7)] or other data directly or indirectly to the provider. It should also encompass situations where the end-user allows access to information without actively supplying it, such as personal data, including the IP address, or other automatically generated information, such as information collected and transmitted by a cookie. In line with the case-law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Court of Justice) on Article 57 TFEU …, remuneration also exists within the meaning of the TFEU if the service provider is paid by a third party and not by the service recipient. The concept of remuneration should therefore also encompass situations in which the end-user is exposed to advertisements as a condition for gaining access to the service, or situations in which the service provider monetises personal data it has collected in accordance with [the GDPR].’
B. German law
16. The Gesetz gegen den unlauteren Wettbewerb (Law against unfair competition) (‘the UWG’), (8) in the version applicable to the dispute in the main proceedings, provides, in Paragraph 3(1), that unfair commercial practices are prohibited by law and, in Paragraph 3(3), that the commercial practices directed at consumers listed in the annex to that law are unlawful in all circumstances.
17. Under the first part of the sentence in point 21 of the annex to Paragraph 3(3) of the UWG, in the version in force at the material time, offering a good or service as ‘gratis’, ‘free of charge’, ‘without cost’ or similar, where costs must nevertheless be borne in that regard, is an unlawful commercial practice within the meaning of Paragraph 3(3) of the UWG.
18. Under the first part of the sentence in point 20 of the annex to Paragraph 3(3) of the UWG, in the version currently in force, which is now entitled ‘Misleading advertising claiming that something is free of charge’, offering a good or service as ‘gratis’, ‘free of charge’, ‘without cost’ or similar, as a commercial practice directed at consumers, is always unlawful where costs must nevertheless be borne for the good or service concerned.
II. The dispute in the main proceedings and the question referred for a preliminary ruling
19. The Federal Union is an association of consumer organisations. It argues that the use of the Facebook is not free of charge, since users provide their personal data in exchange for that use. It therefore claims that the statement in question is misleading and constitutes an unfair commercial practice.
20. The Federal Union brought an action before the Landgericht Berlin (Regional Court, Berlin, Germany), seeking an order that Meta refrain from using the statement in question on its website in the context of its commercial dealings with consumers who are resident in Germany. By decision of 16 January 2018, that court dismissed the action. It held that the national provision transposing point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 applies only where there are hidden costs, in the sense of a direct or indirect payment obligation or a financial burden on the consumer. The court also stated that the disclosure of personal data and the consent required for their processing affect the consumer only in his or her immaterial interests, namely the right to self-determination as regards information. By decision of 20 December 2019, the Kammergericht (Higher Regional Court, Berlin, Germany) dismissed an appeal by the Federal Union against that decision.
21. The Federal Union then brought an appeal on a point of law before the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany), the referring court.
22. According to that court, the wording of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, and consequently the national provision that transposes it, may be interpreted in more than one way. It observes that the concept of costs to be paid covers, in any event, burdens which diminish the consumer’s assets. In addition, the disclosure of personal data and consent to the processing of those data for commercial purposes may be regarded as falling within that concept of costs, since such data constitute a valuable asset for the undertaking that exploits them. The referring court considers that the context and objective of that provision within EU consumer law may support such an interpretation. However, that court, whose decisions are not amenable to appeal, considers that the answer to that question is not so obvious as to leave no scope for any reasonable doubt. (9)
23. In those circumstances, the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice) decided to stay the proceedings and to refer the following question to the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling:
‘Does the term “cost” within the meaning of point 20 of Annex I to [Directive 2005/29], in conjunction with Article 5(5) thereof, also cover the disclosure of personal data and consent to their use for commercial purposes?’
III. Assessment
24. The referring court asks, in essence, whether the term ‘cost’, within the meaning of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, read in conjunction with Article 5(5) of that directive, covers the disclosure of personal data by consumers and their consent to the use of those data for commercial purposes.
25. Before turning to the question referred, it should be noted, first, as regards the scope of Directive 2005/29, that Article 2(c) thereof provides that the term ‘product’ is to be understood broadly as ‘any good or service’. The operation of a social network such as Facebook, and the supply thereof to users, is a service within the meaning of that provision. That was so at the time of the facts giving rise to the national proceedings and remains the case following the amendment introduced by Directive 2019/2161, which expressly provides that the definition of the term ‘product’ also encompasses digital services and digital content. (10) Describing such a service as free of charge on the page by which users register is, moreover, a business-to-consumer commercial practice within the meaning of Article 2(d) of that directive, being a representation directly connected with the promotion of a product. It follows that a practice such as that at issue in the main proceedings falls within the material scope of Directive 2005/29.
26. Second, with regard to the temporal scope, it is apparent from the order for reference that the statement in question was published on Facebook’s website in February 2015. The referring court explains that the injunction sought in the main proceedings presupposes that the conduct was unlawful both at the time of the facts giving rise to those proceedings and on the date of the hearing in the proceedings in the appeal on a point of law, held on 3 July 2025. (11) Neither Article 5 of Directive 2005/29 nor point 20 of Annex I thereto were among the provisions amended by Directive 2019/2161, and both have remained unchanged throughout that period. (12) It follows that the analysis set out below applies to both points in time referred to by the national court.
27. As to the substance, Article 5(1) of Directive 2005/29 prohibits unfair commercial practices. Article 5(5) states that Annex I thereto contains a list of commercial practices that are in all circumstances to be considered as unfair. In that regard, recital 17 of that directive expressly states that the practices listed in Annex I will be deemed to be unfair without having to be subject to a case-by-case assessment against the provisions of Articles 5 to 9. (13) Under point 20 of Annex I to that directive, that category includes ‘describing a product as “gratis”, “free”, “without charge” or similar if the consumer has to pay anything other than the unavoidable cost of responding to the commercial practice and collecting or paying for delivery of the item.’
28. The question referred is framed in terms of a ‘cost’ that the consumer has to ‘pay’, reflecting the German-language version of point 20 of Annex I, under which the prohibition applies where the consumer has to bear additional costs – ‘weitere Kosten’ – other than those which are unavoidable. However, in other language versions, that point does not refer to a cost, but to what the consumer ‘has to pay’, beyond the unavoidable costs which it excludes from its scope. (14) Therefore, the concept requiring interpretation is that of what the consumer ‘has to pay’ within the meaning of that point, and it is in that sense that the term ‘cost’ used in the question referred will be understood.
29. In that regard, it should be borne in mind that, in interpreting a provision of EU law, it is necessary to consider its wording, the context in which it appears and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it forms part. (15)
A. Literal interpretation
30. As regards the wording of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, it should be observed that the different language versions do not use the same terminology to describe the burden placed on the consumer. To that effect, three groups of versions may be distinguished.
31. In the first, the terms employed denote the payment of a sum of money. (16)
32. In the second group, the terms employed extend to the bearing of a charge of any kind, including a counter-performance that is not monetary but has an economic value. (17) The German version, which is the language of the case and the version in which the statement in question was expressed, belongs to that group.
33. In the third group, the wording admits of either interpretation: a verb of payment, which ordinarily suggests a sum of money, is coupled with an indefinite expression which specifies nothing as to what is paid beyond the excluded costs or what form it takes. (18)
34. It follows that the wording of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 is not uniform. Several versions require the payment of a sum of money, others imply a counter-performance having economic value, and others again admit of either reading. Therefore, the wording alone does not make it possible to determine whether counter-performance other than money is covered by that provision.
35. In that respect, it should be noted that the Court has already, when interpreting another part of the same annex, addressed a discrepancy between the language versions regarding the concept of payment, ruling in favour of a broader interpretation. In the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, (19) the Court interpreted the first sentence of point 11 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29. (20) It observed that certain language versions used terms suggesting payment in the sense of paying a sum of money, (21) whereas others were drafted more broadly. (22) After examining the provision, taking into account its context and objectives, the Court did not limit its scope to monetary payment. It held that a trader ‘pays for’ a promotion where it provides consideration with an asset value, whether in the form of payment of a sum of money or in any other form, provided that there is a definite link between that consideration and the publication. (23) Therefore, the fact that point 20 of Annex I uses a verb denoting payment does not, in and of itself, limit that provision to a monetary payment.
36. In accordance with the Court’s settled case-law, the wording of a provision of EU law in a particular language cannot be used as the sole basis for interpreting that provision, nor can it take precedence over other language versions. The need for uniform application and, therefore, for uniform interpretation of an EU act precludes considering one version in isolation. Instead, it is necessary to consider not only its wording, but also the context in which it occurs and the objectives pursued by the rules of which it is part. (24)
B. Contextual interpretation
37. As already observed, (25) in the present case, the legality of the conduct had to be assessed both in February 2015 and on the date of the hearing in the proceedings on a point of law, held on 3 July 2025. Several of the instruments referred to below were adopted between those two dates. This Opinion does not refer to them as having altered the meaning of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, which has remained unchanged. Rather, the intention is to show how the EU legislature has come to characterise the supply of personal data in exchange for a digital service.
1. The internal coherence of Annex I to Directive 2005/29
38. As I have already pointed out, (26) the Court held in the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg that a trader pays for the promotion of a product (a practice commonly known as an ‘advertorial’ (27)), within the meaning of the first sentence of point 11 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, where it provides consideration having an asset value, whether in the form of a sum of money or in any other form, provided that there is a definite link between that consideration and the publication. (28) In that case, the benefit consisted of the advertiser making the rights to use copyrighted images available to the media operator free of charge. (29) Thus, the advertiser did not pay a sum of money, but rather granted a right to use images which, as far as can be ascertained from the judgment, it continued to hold. Nevertheless, the Court held that that benefit could constitute payment since it had an asset value and was intended to promote the advertiser’s sales. (30)
39. It follows that payment for the purposes of point 11 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 does not require the person who makes the benefit available to be deprived of it. What matters is that the benefit has an asset value and is linked to the commercial practice in question. The specific form of the benefit is irrelevant from a consumer protection perspective. (31) In that respect, the situation of a consumer registering with a social network is similar. By disclosing his or her personal data, the consumer is not deprived of them, just as the advertiser in the Peek & Cloppenburg case was not deprived of the images it made available. Rather, the consumer permits the trader to use those data, and that usage, together with the consent that makes it lawful, is exploited by the trader to finance the service.
40. Such an interpretation of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 aligns with the position expressed by the Commission in its notice entitled ‘Guidance on the interpretation and application of Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market’. (32) That document clarifies that the directive encompasses all commercial practices involving products labelled as ‘free’, and does not establish a monetary payment as a prerequisite for its application. It states that products presented as ‘free’ are especially common in the online sector; many such services, however, collect the personal data of users, such as their identity and email address. It also points to the growing awareness of the economic value of information relating to consumers’ preferences, personal data, and other user-generated content. (33)
2. The economic value of personal data
41. In the judgment in Meta Platforms and Others, (34) the Court found that the business model of the online social network Facebook was based on financing through online advertising, tailored to individual users according, inter alia, to their consumer behaviour, interests, purchasing power, and personal situation. (35) That advertising was made possible by the automated production of detailed user profiles. When considering in that case whether a national competition authority may take compliance with the GDPR into account, the Court observed that access to and use of personal data are of great importance in the context of the digital economy. (36) That importance is illustrated by the business model in question in that case, (37) and access to personal data and the ability to process them have become significant parameters of competition between undertakings in the digital economy. (38)
42. It follows that the personal data disclosed by a consumer upon registering on that social network, and the consent permitting their use for advertising purposes, have an asset value in the hands of the trader and serve to finance the service supplied to the consumer. The definite link required by the case-law referred to above is likewise present (39) since registration on that social network is conditional on the provision of those data and on the giving of that consent, while the advertising which the data make possible is what finances the service.
3. Other instruments of EU law
43. The following three instruments are relevant for the purposes of the contextual interpretation in the present case: the European Electronic Communications Code; Directive 2019/770, which governs contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services; and Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights, as amended by Directive 2019/2161.
44. Those three directives may be relied upon despite their objects differing from those of Directive 2005/29. Directive 2019/2161 extended Directive 2011/83 to digital services supplied in exchange for personal data and also amended Directive 2005/29 itself, in particular by extending the definition of ‘product’ to digital services and digital content. (40) Thus, the EU legislature adapted both instruments to the digital economy through a single legislative act. The aforementioned instruments are based on Article 114 TFEU or, in the case of Directive 2005/29, on Article 95 EC, which it replaced, (41) and thus contribute, each in its own field, to the proper functioning of the internal market. It would be inconsistent to characterise the same commercial reality as involving a counter-performance for the purposes of one or other of those instruments and as free of charge for the purposes of Directive 2005/29.
(a) The European Electronic Communications Code
45. According to the European Electronic Communications Code a service must normally be provided in exchange for remuneration in order to fall within the definition of an electronic communications service. While that directive is not at issue in the present case, recital 16 thereof shows how the EU legislature understands the concept of remuneration in the digital economy.
46. That recital states that market participants increasingly consider information about users as having a monetary value. It adds that electronic communications services are often supplied to end users in exchange for personal or other data rather than for money. Therefore, the concept of remuneration should encompass situations in which the provider of a service requests personal data or other data, and the end user knowingly makes it available. That remuneration encompasses equally situations where the end user allows access to information without actively supplying it, such as an IP address or information collected by a cookie. A service may also be paid for by a third party, rather than by a service recipient. (42) That means that this concept covers situations in which the end user is presented with advertisements in order to gain access to the service, as well as situations in which the service provider monetises personal data it has collected.
47. I draw two points from that recital for the present case. First, the EU legislature has recognised that the provision of personal data may constitute remuneration for a service in a related field, that of electronic communications services. Second, it has recognised that a service financed by advertising or by the monetisation of data collected from users is to be regarded as provided for remuneration. It follows that a service offered on those terms cannot be regarded as supplied free of charge.
(b) Consumer contracts for digital content and digital services
48. Directive 2019/770 applies both to contracts under which the consumer pays a price and, under the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) thereof, to those under which the consumer instead provides personal data, provided that those data are not processed solely to provide the service or to enable the trader to comply with legal obligations. (43) Such an exception shows that the legislature was referring to an exchange. A contract falls within the scope of that directive if the trader processes the data for its own purposes, as is the case where a consumer’s data are collected upon registration on a social network and are used to display personalised advertisements.
49. As far as digital services are concerned, Directive 2011/83 was amended by Directive 2019/2161 to include Article 3(1a), which covers contracts where the trader provides a digital service in exchange for personal data from the consumer. (44) Due to the similarities and the interchangeability between paid digital services and digital services provided in exchange for personal data, the two should be subject to the same rules. (45) Therefore, for the purposes of consumer protection, the EU legislature has deemed the supply of a digital service in exchange for personal data to be equivalent to the supply of digital services in exchange for payment.
50. As I have noted above, (46) it would be inconsistent to treat the same commercial reality as an exchange under one instrument and as being free under another. The examples given in recital 24 of Directive 2019/770 describe, in essence, the situation before the referring court. That directive applies where a consumer opens a social media account and provides a name and email address that are used for purposes beyond supplying the service or complying with legal requirements. It also applies where the consumer consents to the processing, for marketing purposes, of material constituting personal data, such as photographs or posts which he or she uploads.
51. Both parts of the question referred to – namely the disclosure of personal data and the consent to their use for commercial purposes – correspond to situations which the EU legislature has expressly contemplated. A reading of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, under which a service obtained on those very terms could be described to consumers as free of charge, would be difficult to reconcile with the equivalence so established.
52. Taken together, those instruments reflect a development that the EU legislature has consistently recognised: in the digital economy, services are increasingly being supplied to consumers in exchange for their personal data rather than for money, and such business models are being used, in various forms, across a considerable part of the market. (47) It is against that background that point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 should be interpreted.
C. Teleological interpretation
53. The objective pursued by Directive 2005/29 is, among other things, to achieve a high level of consumer protection against unfair commercial practices. That objective is based on the premiss that consumers are generally in a weaker position than traders, particularly with regard to information and expertise. (48) That premiss is reflected in recitals 7, 11, 13 and 14 of that directive, which refer to commercial practices that are directly aimed at influencing consumers’ transactional decisions, distorting their economic behaviour, or preventing them from making an informed and thus efficient choice. (49)
54. In that context, a consumer who is asked to pay a sum of money knows what he or she gives in return for the service. However, a consumer who obtains access to a service by disclosing personal data and consenting to their use for commercial purposes is in a different position. That person is unlikely to be aware of the economic value of what he or she is giving, or of the extent of the advertising to which the disclosure of those data may give rise. (50) It follows that the imbalance of information which Directive 2005/29 takes into account is particularly pronounced where the counter-performance required of the consumer is not expressed in figures by which its value may be assessed, which is the case with personal data. (51)
55. Interpreting point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 as referring only to the payment of money would be difficult to reconcile with the objective of that provision. The Court has already held that interpreting the concept of ‘payment’ in point 11 of Annex I as requiring the payment of a sum of money would not reflect the reality of journalistic and advertising practice; it would in large measure deprive that provision of its effectiveness. (52) The same applies to point 20 of that annex. Services described as ‘free’ are especially common in the online sector, where they are often financed by collecting and exploiting user data rather than charging a price. (53) Therefore, such an interpretation would deprive point 20 of much of its effect in the very sector in which it is most needed. (54)
56. Similarly, the practices listed in Annex I to Directive 2005/29 are to be deemed unfair without having to be subject to a case-by-case assessment against the provisions of Articles 5 to 9 of that directive. (55) An argument founded on the understanding of the average consumer would be to apply a criterion specific to Articles 6 and 7 of the directive, which has no place in the application of Annex I thereto. For all those reasons, a position that a service is free of charge whenever the consumer is under no obligation to pay a sum of money cannot be accepted.
57. It follows from the foregoing that the concept of what the consumer ‘has to pay’ within the meaning of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, read in conjunction with Article 5(5) of that directive, encompasses the disclosure of personal data and consent to their use for commercial purposes, provided that those data are not processed exclusively in order to supply the service in question or to enable the trader to comply with legal requirements to which it is subject.
D. Whether that interpretation is called into question by other considerations
58. That conclusion is not called into question by the arguments put forward by Meta concerning the exhaustive nature of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, the protection already afforded by the GDPR, and the freedoms to conduct a business and to provide services.
59. First, Meta submits that Annex I to Directive 2005/29 contains an exhaustive list of practices which are unfair in all circumstances, and that Article 5(5) of that directive reserves the right to modify the list to a revision of the directive itself, meaning that list must be interpreted strictly.
60. In that respect, what that Article 5(5) of Directive 2005/29 reserves to the legislature is the composition of the list – that is, which practices appear in it – and not the meaning of the terms in which each practice is described. The judgments relied on by Meta in that regard concerned national rules prohibiting practices which do not appear in Annex I to Directive 2005/29. (56) The present case involves no such addition, since the practice in question is described in point 20 of Annex I itself. Nor does the need for a narrow reading follow from the fact that the practices listed in that annex are to be deemed unfair without having to be subject to a case-by-case assessment against the provisions of Articles 5 to 9 of that directive. The purpose of that list is to avoid difficult individual assessments. (57) It follows that point 20 of that annex is to be applied without regard to the understanding of the average consumer in the individual case, but not that the terms in which that point is cast must be given a narrow meaning. The Court’s own approach confirms this. In the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, having expressly recalled that Annex I contains an exhaustive list, (58) the Court construed the concept of ‘payment’, under point 11 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, as encompassing consideration having an asset value in the form of payment of a sum of money or in any other form, on the ground that a narrower interpretation would deprive that provision of its effectiveness.
61. Second, Meta submits that the protection of consumers with regard to the processing of their personal data is already ensured by the GDPR, particularly through the transparency requirements set out in Article 12 et seq. thereof, such that a broad interpretation of point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 is not necessary.
62. In that respect, the GDPR ensures the lawful and transparent processing of personal data, while Directive 2005/29 governs commercial practices directly connected with the promotion, sale or supply of a product to consumers. In accordance with the GDPR, a trader may exhaustively disclose the purposes for which the collected data will be processed and still describe the service to which those data give access as free of charge. The description of a service as ‘free of charge’ is not itself an act of processing personal data. That regulation governs the lawfulness and transparency of such processing, that is, what data are processed, for what purposes, and what the data subject must be told about it. It is not concerned with the accuracy of a statement concerning the terms on which the service is offered. The assessment of such a statement is a matter for Directive 2005/29. The Court has accordingly held that compliance with the GDPR and the application of other bodies of EU law with different objectives are cumulative rather than alternative. (59)
63. Nor does Article 3(4) of Directive 2005/29 lead to a different conclusion. Under that provision, that directive gives way only to other EU rules that regulate specific aspects of unfair commercial practices in the event of a conflict. (60) The Court has held that rules obliging traders to provide certain information to consumers do not, in themselves, regulate specific aspects of unfair commercial practices. (61) The same applies to the transparency requirements set out in Article 12 et seq. of the GDPR. In any event, a conflict within the meaning of Article 3(4) of Directive 2005/29 only exists where other rules impose obligations on traders, in such a way as to leave them no margin for discretion, which are incompatible with those laid down by Directive 2005/29. (62) That is not the case here, as a trader can comply with the GDPR while also refraining from describing a service as ‘free of charge’ when counter-performance is actually required.
64. Third, Meta submits that Directive 2005/29 should be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the freedom to conduct a business, as set out in Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘the Charter’), and the freedom to provide services, as set out in Article 56 TFEU. On that basis, it argues that point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 should be given a narrower interpretation.
65. That submission is based on a misreading of what is prohibited by point 20 of Annex I. If a trader requires nothing from the consumer beyond the unavoidable costs referred to in that provision, it may advertise the service as ‘free’ or ‘without charge’. Similarly, a trader whose service is financed by the use of personal data is free to inform consumers of the terms on which that service is offered. However, it may not describe the service as ‘free of charge’ if the consumer ‘has to pay’ for it within the meaning of that provision.
66. Therefore, the interpretation that I propose entails no restriction on the freedom to conduct a business or on the freedom to provide services. Those freedoms do not confer the right to provide inaccurate descriptions of services and the question of whether restrictions on them are justified and proportionate does not arise. In any event, neither of those freedoms is absolute. (63) A prohibition on describing a service as ‘free’ when counter-performance is actually required would, in any case, constitute a permissible limitation, although that is for the national court to assess. Such a prohibition pursues the consumer protection objective set out in Article 38 of the Charter and merely requires the description of a service to correspond to the terms on which it is offered.
67. The case-law relied on by Meta in that regard does not support a different conclusion. The judgments in question concerned prohibitions on commercial communications which were accurate in substance, and the Court examined whether a general ban on such communications was proportionate to the objective pursued. (64) No comparable question arises where the description at issue is, in any event, inaccurate.
68. None of those arguments therefore calls the interpretation set out in point 57 above into question.
IV. Conclusion
69. In the light of the foregoing considerations, I propose that the Court answer the question referred for a preliminary ruling by the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal Court of Justice, Germany) as follows:
Point 20 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’), read in conjunction with Article 5(5) of that directive,
must be interpreted as meaning that the term ‘cost’, within the meaning of that point 20, which refers to what the consumer ‘has to pay’, covers the disclosure of personal data by the consumer and his or her consent to the use of those data for commercial purposes, provided that those data are not processed exclusively in order to supply the service in question or to enable the trader to comply with legal requirements to which it is subject.
1 Original language: English.
2 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005 concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in the internal market and amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directives 97/7/EC, 98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council (‘Unfair Commercial Practices Directive’) (OJ 2005 L 149, p. 22).
3 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 November 2019 amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directives 98/6/EC, 2005/29 and 2011/83/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the better enforcement and modernisation of Union consumer protection rules (OJ 2019 L 328, p. 7).
4 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 on certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content and digital services (OJ 2019 L 136, p. 1).
5 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council (OJ 2011 L 304, p. 64).
6 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European Electronic Communications Code (OJ 2018 L 321, p. 36).
7 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (OJ 2016 L 119, p. 1) (‘the GDPR’).
8 BGBl. 2010 I, p. 254.
9 See paragraph 11 of the order for reference, citing the judgment of 6 October 2021, Consorzio Italian Management and Catania Multiservizi (C‑561/19, EU:C:2021:799, paragraph 32 et seq.).
10 Point (c) of Article 2 of Directive 2005/29 was replaced by Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 2019/2161 and now reads: ‘“product” means any good or service including immovable property, digital service and digital content, as well as rights and obligations’. In the version applicable at the time of the facts in the main proceedings, that provision read: ‘“product” means any goods or service including immovable property, rights and obligations’.
11 See paragraph 12 of the order for reference.
12 Point 20 of Annex I to, and Article 5 of, Directive 2005/29 were also unaffected by the amendments made by Directive (EU) 2024/825 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 February 2024 amending Directives 2005/29 and 2011/83 as regards empowering consumers for the green transition through better protection against unfair practices and through better information (OJ L, 2024/825). In any case, its transposition deadline was 27 March 2026 and Member States must apply the measures from 27 September 2026; both of those dates are after the hearing on the appeal on a point of law of 3 July 2025.
13 See, to that effect, judgments of 23 April 2009, VTB-VAB and Galatea (C‑261/07 and C‑299/07, EU:C:2009:244, paragraph 56); of 13 September 2018, Wind Tre and Vodafone Italia (C‑54/17 and C‑55/17, EU:C:2018:710, paragraph 40 and the case-law cited); and of 14 November 2024, Compass Banca (C‑646/22, EU:C:2024:957, paragraphs 65 and 66).
14 See point 34 below.
15 Judgment of 4 February 2025, Keren (C‑158/23, EU:C:2025:52, paragraph 50 and the case-law cited).
16 See, for example, the Bulgarian-, Croatian-, Estonian-, Finnish-, Polish-, Romanian-, Slovenian- and Spanish-language versions: the Bulgarian-language version uses the verb ‘плати’ (‘to pay’) and the noun ‘цена’ (‘price’) in place of ‘costs’; the Croatian-language version uses ‘iznos’ (‘amount’), which implies a sum of money or at least a pecuniary value; in the Estonian-language version the descriptors are ‘prii’, ‘tasuta’ and ‘ilma rahata’, the last meaning ‘without money’; in the Finnish-language version ‘maksuton’ means literally ‘without payment’; the Polish-language version uses ‘należność’, defined as the sum due or the amount to be paid; the Romanian-language version reads ‘o sumă în plus față de costurile’ (‘a sum in addition to the costs’); the Slovenian-language version reads ‘če mora potrošnik plačati kakršen koli znesek’ (‘if the consumer must pay any amount’); and the Spanish-language version requires the consumer to ‘abonar dinero por cualquier concepto distinto …’ (‘pay money for anything other than …’), which is among the most explicit references to money in any version.
17 See, for example, the German-, Italian-, Latvian-, Lithuanian-, Portuguese- and Slovak-language versions: the German-language version requires that the consumer bear further costs – ‘weitere Kosten … zu tragen hat’ – the verb employed denoting the bearing of a burden rather than the payment of a price; the Italian terms ‘pagare’ (‘to pay’) and ‘costo’ (‘cost’) suggest a payment in money, although their use in a more general sense, denoting any counter-performance, cannot be excluded; the Latvian-language version includes among its descriptors ‘bez atlīdzības’, that is to say, without remuneration, which denotes the absence of a counter-performance rather than the absence of a price, and provides that the consumer must pay ‘vēl kas vairāk par obligātajām izmaksām’ (‘something more than the obligatory costs’), an expression which specifies nothing as to what that something is; the Lithuanian-language version provides that the consumer must pay for something else, without specifying what; in the Portuguese-language version the descriptors are ‘grátis’, ‘gratuito’, ‘sem encargos’ and ‘equivalente’; ‘sem encargos’ may denote a product free not only of costs but also of charges other than pecuniary ones, and no pecuniary expression is employed either in the description of the product or in the designation of the consumer’s burden; and in the Slovak-language version the unavoidable costs are mentioned only in order to be excluded, nothing being said of what the consumer pays beyond them.
18 See, for example, the Dutch-, English-, Greek-, Hungarian-, Maltese- and Swedish-language versions: the Dutch-language version reads ‘iets anders moet betalen dan de onvermijdelijke kosten’ (‘must pay something other than the unavoidable costs’) and includes among its descriptors ‘voor niets’, literally ‘for nothing’, which denotes the absence of any counter-performance rather than the absence of a price – it may be added that the expression ‘betalen met je gegevens’ (‘to pay with your data’) is in common use in Dutch in the context at issue; the English-language version provides that the prohibition applies ‘if the consumer has to pay anything other than the unavoidable cost’ – pay ordinarily denotes a sum of money but may extend to the supply of other things of value, and anything adds no further precision; the Greek-language version employs a term denoting payment, which may be understood in the narrower sense of a sum of money or in a wider sense covering any counter-performance, including a payment in kind; the Hungarian-language version reads ‘az elkerülhetetlen költségén felül bármit is fizetnie kell’ (‘must pay anything over and above the unavoidable cost’); the comparison thus drawn with the unavoidable cost suggests that the two are of the same nature, although the payment of a sum of money is nowhere expressly required; the Maltese-language version employs a term denoting a price, which ordinarily refers to a monetary amount, while leaving undefined what paying anything covers; the Swedish-language version reads ‘betala annat än den oundvikliga kostnaden’ (‘to pay something other than the unavoidable cost’), the pronoun annat serving to exclude the unavoidable cost without specifying the object of the payment beyond it.
19 Judgment of 2 September 2021 (C‑371/20, ‘the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg’, EU:C:2021:674).
20 Point 11 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29, which has remained unamended, provides: ‘Using editorial content in the media to promote a product where a trader has paid for the promotion without making that clear in the content or by images or sounds clearly identifiable by the consumer (advertorial). …’.
21 Such as the Spanish-, German-, English-, Dutch- and Polish-language versions. See the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, paragraph 36.
22 Such as the French- and Italian-language versions, ibid.
23 Ibid., paragraphs 37 to 42 and 49.
24 See, to that effect and inter alia, judgments of 17 November 1983, Merck (292/82, EU:C:1983:335, paragraph 12), and of 9 January 2025, Österreichische Datenschutzbehörde (Excessive requests) (C‑416/23, EU:C:2025:3, paragraph 24).
25 See point 26above.
26 See point 35 above.
27 The first sentence of point 11 of Annex I to Directive 2005/29 defines it as ‘using editorial content in the media to promote a product where a trader has paid for the promotion without making that clear in the content or by images or sounds clearly identifiable by the consumer’.
28 See, to that effect, the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, paragraph 49.
29 Ibid., paragraphs 20 and 46.
30 Ibid., paragraph 46.
31 See, to that effect, ibid., paragraph 41.
32 OJ 2021 C 526, p. 1.
33 Section 3.4, ‘Use of the claim “free” – No 20’, p. 66.
34 Judgment of 4 July 2023, Meta Platforms and Others (General terms of use of a social network) (C‑252/21, ‘the judgment in Meta Platforms and Others, EU:C:2023:537).
35 Ibid., paragraph 27.
36 Ibid., paragraph 50.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., paragraph 51.
39 See the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, paragraph 49.
40 Article 3(1)(a) of Directive 2019/2161, replacing point (c) of Article 2 of Directive 2005/29.
41 See the reference in the first recital of each of those acts.
42 Recital 16 of Directive 2018/1972 refers in that regard to the Court’s case-law on Article 57 TFEU. See, inter alia, judgment of 11 September 2014, Papasavvas, C‑291/13, EU:C:2014:2209, paragraph 29 and the case-law cited.
43 In Directive 2019/770, the concept of price extends only to money and to digital representations of value serving as a method of payment, such as electronic vouchers or e-coupons (Article 2(7); see recital 23 thereof), and the provision of personal data is nowhere referred to as a means of counter-performance.
44 Inserted by Article 4(2)(b) of Directive 2019/2161. Article 3(1a) also covers digital content which is not supplied on a tangible medium; it is the extension to digital services that is relevant in the present case.
45 Recital 31 of Directive 2019/2161.
46 See point 44 above.
47 See recital 16 of Directive 2018/1972, recital 24 of Directive 2019/770 and recital 31 of Directive 2019/2161. See also the judgment in Meta Platforms and Others, paragraphs 50 and 51.
48 The judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, paragraph 39. See also judgments of 18 October 2012, Purely Creative and Others (C‑428/11, EU:C:2012:651, paragraph 48), and of 12 June 2019, Orange Polska (C‑628/17, EU:C:2019:480, paragraph 36 and the case-law cited).
49 Concerning recitals 7, 11, 13 and 14 of Directive 2005/29, see, to that effect, judgment of 14 November 2024, Compass Banca (C‑646/22, EU:C:2024:957, paragraph 49).
50 See paragraph 31 of the order for reference.
51 The same may be said of the benefit at issue in the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, where permission to use copyright-protected images had an asset value but no figure attached to it by which that value could be determined. See point 38 above.
52 See, to that effect, the judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, paragraph 42.
53 See points 39 and 40 above, and the Commission guidance referred to therein.
54 See point 54 above, and paragraph 31 of the order for reference.
55 See point 27 above.
56 Judgments of 14 January 2010, Plus Warenhandelsgesellschaft (C‑304/08, EU:C:2010:12, paragraph 45), and of 14 November 2024, Compass Banca (C‑646/22, EU:C:2024:957, paragraph 67).
57 Judgment of 18 October 2012, Purely Creative and Others (C‑428/11, EU:C:2012:651, paragraph 46).
58 The judgment in Peek & Cloppenburg, paragraph 49. Where the Court has given a narrow interpretation of an entry in Annex I, it has done so in a manner consistent with the purpose of that annex rather than in the trader’s favour: see judgment of 18 October 2012, Purely Creative and Others (C‑428/11, EU:C:2012:651, paragraph 41).
59 See, to that effect, judgment of 4 October 2024, Lindenapotheke (C‑21/23, EU:C:2024:846, paragraph 74 et seq.), and the judgment in Meta Platforms and Others, paragraph 47 et seq.
60 Judgment of 13 September 2018, Wind Tre and Vodafone Italia (C‑54/17 and C‑55/17, EU:C:2018:710, paragraph 58 and the case-law cited).
61 Ibid., paragraphs 65 and 66.
62 Ibid., paragraphs 60 and 61.
63 As regards the freedom to conduct a business, see Article 52(1) of the Charter, under which any limitation on the exercise of the rights recognised by the Charter ‘must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms’ and, ‘subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others.’ See also judgments of 6 September 2012, Deutsches Weintor (C‑544/10, EU:C:2012:526, paragraph 54 and the case-law cited), and of 22 January 2013, Sky Österreich (C‑283/11, EU:C:2013:28, paragraphs 45 and 46).
64 See judgments of 4 May 2017, Vanderborght (C‑339/15, EU:C:2017:335, paragraph 76); of 14 November 2024, Compass Banca (C‑646/22, EU:C:2024:957, paragraph 96), which concerned a measure imposed by a national authority in respect of a practice not listed in Annex I; and of 19 June 2025, Commission v Poland (Advertising for pharmacies) (C‑200/24, EU:C:2025:459, paragraphs 73 and 100).